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Risk, Charity, and Boundary Disputes: The Liberalization and
Commercialization of Online Bingo in the European Union
DONAL CASEY*
Le bingo en salle a toujours été perçu comme une forme sociale de jeu à faible
risque. On y joue souvent lors des collectes de fonds pour une œuvre de
bienfaisance et, dans de nombreux pays, il est associé aux causes honorables et à
la communauté, plutôt qu’au risque ou au profit. Ces caractéristiques distinctives
ont forgé la réglementation sur le bingo dans bien des administrations. Toutefois,
les progrès technologiques ont transformé la nature de ce jeu, qui est maintenant
accessible en ligne, et ont remis en cause les approches réglementaires
traditionnelles. Dans cet article, je présente l’évolution de la réglementation du
bingo en ligne afin de dégager ce que nous pouvons apprendre sur les nouvelles
façons qu’adoptent les pays pour gouverner le jeu spéculatif sous l’angle du risque.
Du même coup, je propose une nouvelle interprétation de la propension croissante
des États membres de l’UE à gouverner le jeu en fonction du risque. À mon avis,
la légalisation et la libéralisation du bingo en ligne sont une forme de gouvernance
entrepreneuriale dictée par des marchés libéralisés et l’abolition des frontières
nationales par la technologie.
Land-based bingo has traditionally been perceived as a low-risk social form of
gambling. The game is often run for purposes of charitable fundraising, and in
many countries bingo is associated in good causes and community rather than risk
or profit. These distinguishing characteristics have shaped bingo’s regulation in
many jurisdictions. However, technological advances have changed the nature of
the game as it moved online and challenged traditional approaches to regulation.
In this paper, I document the evolution of online bingo regulation in order to
explore what we can learn about the changing ways in which states govern
speculative play through frameworks of risk. In so doing, I offer a new reading of
the growing propensity of EU Member States to govern gambling through risk. I
argue that the legalisation and liberalisation of online bingo is a form of
enterprising governance, driven by liberalised markets and the erosion of national
borders by technology.

I think risk is the … overarching theme now … because I think
if you are going to really get to the nub of what’s important
within the regulatory framework … is to talk about risk and the
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appetite for risk. How much will they permit in order to have a
functioning economic model?1

IN THIS PAPER, I DOCUMENT THE EVOLUTION OF ONLINE BINGO REGULATION in the
European Union (EU) from the game’s emergence in the late 1990s. By foregrounding online
bingo in an analysis of gambling regulation, I explore what we can learn about the changing
ways in which states govern speculative play through frameworks of risk. Building upon and
developing the work of law and society scholars, as well as critical gambling scholars, I offer
a new reading of the growing propensity of EU Member States to govern gambling through
risk, in the sense that risk orientates how states view, imagine, and deal with problems.2 I argue
that the legalization and liberalization of online bingo is a form of enterprising governance,
driven by liberalized markets and the erosion of national borders by technology. Technology
not only challenges traditional approaches to gambling regulation, it allows states to embrace
the economically productive nature of risk taking.
When you think of bingo, it is unlikely that risk is the first word that comes to mind.
Bingo is generally not seen as a form of risky consumption. Indeed, Kate Bedford argues that
bingo has a “liminal status as not real gambling,” but is “a site of social interaction, community,
and even care.”3 As a “key form of charitable gambling,”4 land-based bingo has traditionally
been associated more with charitable fundraising and good causes than risk, private profit, and
commercial gambling. It is also a game rooted in national, local, and community
environments.5 These characteristics have shaped the game’s regulation in many countries.
However, as I argue elsewhere, commercial operators and transnational service
providers have commodified, shaped, and driven bingo in its online form.6 These organizations
develop and supply the game’s technological infrastructure of software, platforms, networks,
and plug-ins, which are relied upon by commercial, state, and non-profit gambling enterprises.
Online bingo, like most forms of online gambling, partly remains an offshore industry that
employs technology to penetrate national borders and reach into territories to acquire players
and extract profits. In a sense, technology has rendered national borders porous. While these
transformations have challenged the perception and regulation of online bingo in many EU

1

Interview EU-13, 40 interviews were conducted with key stakeholders in 11 EU countries between 2015-2016.
Further references to these interviews will appear as in-text citations. Transcripts of all interviews are on file with
author.
2
Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government (London: GlassHouse, 2004); Gerda Reith, “Techno Economic
Systems and Excessive Consumption: A Political Economy of ‘Pathological’ Gambling” (2013) 64:4 The British
Journal of Sociology 717; Sytze Kingma, “Gambling and the Risk Society: The Liberalisation and Legitimation
Crisis of Gambling in the Netherlands” (2004) 4:1 International Gambling Studies 47; James F Cosgrave,
“Governing the Gambling Citizen: The State, Consumption, and Risk” in James F Cosgrave & Thomas R.
Klassen, eds, Casino State: Legalized Gambling in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009) 46.
3
Kate Bedford, “Getting the Bingo Hall Back Again? Gender, Gambling Law Reform, and Regeneration Debates
in a District Council Licensing Board” (2011) 20:3 Soc & Leg Stud 369 at 376.
4
Kate Bedford, “Regulating Volunteering: Lessons from the Bingo Halls” (2015) 40:2 Law & Soc Inquiry 461 at
469.
5
Rachael Dixey, “Bingo in Britain: An Analysis of Gender and Class” in Jan McMillen, ed, Gambling Cultures:
Studies in History and Interpretation (New York: Routledge, 1996); Bedford, supra note 3; Jean-Claude
Moubarac, N. Will Shead & Jeffrey L Derevensky, “Bingo Playing and Problem Gambling: A Review of Our
Current Knowledge” (2010) 24 Journal of Gambling Issues 164; Bedford, supra note 4.
6
Donal Casey, “The DNA of Bingo: Charity and Online Bingo” in Michael Egerer, Virve Marionneau & Janne
Nikkinen, eds, Gambling Policies in European Welfare States: Current Challenges and Future Prospects (Cham,
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) 153.
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Member States, so too has bingo’s traditional position as a low-risk lottery style game that is
closely associated with charitable fundraising and good causes.
This paper draws upon extensive research undertaken for The Bingo Project.7 My
analysis and findings are based upon forty interviews with key stakeholders in eleven countries,
legal cases, policy documents, and political debates at the EU and national levels. The paper
unfolds in three parts. First, I introduce the conceptual tools developed by law and society
scholars and critical gambling scholars to understand and analyze the ways in which states seek
to govern through risk (Part I). From here, I examine how online bingo regulation in many EU
Member States has become focused on risk minimization, while governments simultaneously
embrace risk through opening and encouraging enterprise, competition, and innovation in
gambling markets (Part II).8 Finally, I investigate gambling liberalization in Denmark, Sweden,
Ireland, and the Netherlands (Part III). I reveal how these processes of liberalization are
punctuated by boundary disputes over sector ownership of the game. In these boundary
disputes, bingo’s formulation as a commercial commodity jars with its formulation as a means
of fundraising for good causes. The register of these boundary disputes has shifted from one of
charity and public benefit to one of risk, private profit, and commercial industry. Tracing these
moves illuminates the changing ways in which bingo is imagined as it moves online.

I. GOVERNING GAMBLING THROUGH RISK
A. GOVERNING THROUGH RISK
As socio-legal scholar Pat O’Malley notes, “risk has become a much more salient framework
of government in the past half century.”9 This shift is important for socio-legal scholarship,
O’Malley observes, “[B]ecause to regard a problem in terms of a framework of risks changes
both the focus and locus of government.”10 At the most general level, governing through risk
seeks to “[bring] the future into the present” by identifying “a future condition as being more
or less probable” and rendering it governable.11 Such future conditions may concern
individuals, collectives, or populations, and relate to a diverse range of events such as illness,
death, injury, harm, damage, or crime. Here, governing through risk involves “diverse
‘configurations of risk’” and “forms of risk-based government” that have their own
rationalities, techniques, bodies of knowledge, and technologies.12 These configurations of
risk-based governance create new subjectivities, redefine relationships, and assign new
responsibilities.13
Governing through risk is closely linked with practices that of assigning responsibility
for managing risks. More specifically, scholars have noted the changing ways in which states

See Kate Bedford et al, “The Bingo Project: Rethinking Gambling Regulation” (2016) University of Kent,
online: <kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject/resources/Bingo_Project_report_final.pdf> [perma.cc/HYY9-9LDG]; The
Bingo Project, online: <kent.ac.uk/thebingoproject/index.html> [perma.cc/HAH7-RGKL].
8
Tom Baker & Jonathan Simon, eds, Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).
9
Pat O’Malley “Governing Risks”, (2009) Legal Studies Research Paper No 09/86, online:
<ssrn.com/abstract=1473553> at 4.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
O’Malley, supra note 2 at 21.
13
Ibid at 8–9.
7
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govern risk through the responsibilization of individuals to manage their own risks, and how
these changes link to the politics of neoliberalism. As O’Malley explains:
[N]eoliberalism increased the focus on individual responsibility
and sought to wind back the influence of the welfare state as a
means of exposing subjects to risks. In neoliberal visions
exposure to risk made subjects more self-reliant, entrepreneurial,
“active on their own behalf”, less “dependent” and thus “more
free”. The state was to change its role from managing many
harmful risks, for example through social insurances, to
“empowering” individuals to manage their own risks, again all
in the name of greater freedom.14
This “new prudentialism” “throws back” responsibility for managing risks from the state to
individuals themselves, driven by neoliberalism’s central concerns with shrinking the state, the
belief in markets, and the affirmation of individual freedom, responsibility, and choice.15
The “prudent subjects of neo-liberalism” are not reliant upon the state for active
protection from risk or harm, but rather “practise and sustain their autonomy by assembling
information, materials and practices together into a personalized strategy that identifies and
minimizes their exposure to harm.”16 The privatization and individualization of risk creates
enterprising subjects, “free to make choices and to take [responsibility].”17 However, the
“‘prudent’ subjects of neo-liberalism are simultaneously exhorted to become ‘risk takers’.”18
These active citizens are expected to be “‘responsible-risk takers’ who must govern the effects
of their risks on themselves and others.”19 They are exhorted to embrace risk, but at the same
time expected to act rationally to avoid risks and minimize harms, with the result that
irresponsible risk-takers are moralized as incapable of self-governance.20 With this, you begin
to see what Mitchell Dean calls a “division between active citizens (capable of managing their
own risks) and targeted populations (disadvantaged groups, the “at risk,” the high risk) who
will require intervention in the management of risks.”21
Risk, however, is not always something that is viewed as a negative or “constituted in
terms of restrictions on freedom in the name of harm reduction.”22 As Caitlin Zaloom points
out, “[R]isk reaps reward.”23 Risk can be productive, whether for individuals, collectives,
organizations, or states. In their collection Embracing Risk, Tom Baker and Jonathan Simon
note that while risk is generally seen as “something to be avoided, spread or otherwise
managed, not something to be encouraged or embraced,” “risk today is … also about
Pat O’Malley, “Governmentality and the Analysis of Risk” in Adam Burgess, Alberto Alemanno & Jens Zinn,
eds, Routledge Handbook of Risk Studies (New York: Routledge, 2016) 109 at 113.
15
Pat O’Malley, “Risk, Power and Crime Prevention” (1992) 21:3 Economy and Society 252.
16
Pat O’Malley, “Uncertain Subjects: Risks, Liberalism and Contract” (2000) 29:4 Economy and Society 460 at
465.
17
O’Malley, supra note 2 at 8.
18
O’Malley, supra note 16 at 465.
19
O’Malley, supra note 2 at 8.
20
Mitchell Dean, Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society, 2d ed (London: Sage, 2010) at 221;
O’Malley, supra note 2 at 76; Deborah Lupton, Risk, 2d ed (New York: Routledge, 2013) at 90.
21
Dean, supra note 20 at 195.
22
Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Pat O’Malley, “Gendered Risks: An Introduction” in Kelly Hannah-Moffat & Pat
O’Malley, eds, Gendered Risks (New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 1 at 23.
23
Caitlin Zaloom, “The Productive Life of Risk” (2004) 19:3 Cultural Anthropology 365 at 365.
14
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opportunity.”24 The downward devolution of risk from states to individuals shows how
neoliberal political rationality valorizes “responsible risk-taking” and the individual embrace
of risk.25 Here, risk is seen as productive for individuals—risk “must be valued and made
salient, as the source of profit and the root of enterprise and self-reliance.”26 States too embrace
risk and uncertainty, not only through the perceived benefits of the downward devolution of
risk to individuals, but also through enterprising governance that seeks to harness potential
economic growth and profit from opening markets, promoting innovation and entrepreneurship
on liberalized markets, and seizing the opportunities from uncertainties and risk of free
markets.

B. GOVERNING GAMBLING THROUGH RISK
Beginning in the 1980s, states in North America, Australasia, and Europe liberalized gambling
regulations.27 Markham and Young note, “[i]t is no coincidence that gambling liberalisation
occurred concurrently with the ascendance of the neoliberal economic project, with its
emphasis on deregulation and free markets.”28 Neoliberalism’s deregulatory agenda drove the
liberalization of gambling markets, underpinned by its belief in competitive markets and its
central concern with shrinking the state. Further to this, Gerda Reith argues that neoliberal
policies of low taxation, “created a revenue vacuum into which gambling funds appear as an
attractive political solution to states unwilling to levy such unpopular measures on voting
populations.”29 With this, gambling markets expanded as regulation was rolled back to allow
“for ever-larger and more concentrated forms of games of chance” to generate private profit
and tax revenues for states.30 As markets liberalized and expanded, commercial gambling
proliferated. The emergence of the gambling industry and the wave of gambling liberalization
since the 1980s have contributed to a shifting problematization of gambling.
We can view gambling through the prism of risk in two ways. Gambling can be seen as
the consumption of risk where “risks are integral to the consumption experience.”31 Gambling
is also a form of risky consumption that entails unwanted risks of individual and social harm.32
As Reith points out, “[g]ambling has always been regarded as problematic, although the precise
nature of the problem it presents varies according to sociohistorical context and cultural
climate.”33 While once viewed as an unproductive vice, gambling is now seen as economically

24

Baker & Simon, supra note 8 at 20.
O’Malley, supra note 2 at 76.
26
Pat O’Malley, “Imagining Insurance: Risk, Thrift, and Life Insurance in Britain” in Tom Baker & Jonathan
Simon, eds, Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and Responsibility (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2002) 97 at 110.
27
Reith, supra note 2.
28
Francis Markham and Martin Young, “‘Big Gambling’: The Rise of the Global Industry-State Gambling
Complex” (2015) 23:1 Addiction Research & Theory 1 at 2.
29
Reith, supra note 2 at 723.
30
Ibid.
31
Cosgrave, supra note 2 at 46; Stephen Lyng, ed, Edgework: The Sociology of Risk-Taking (New York:
Routledge, 2005); Sytze F. Kingma, “Introduction: Global Gambling” in Sytze Kingma, ed, Global Gambling:
Cultural Perspectives on Gambling Organizations (New York: Routledge, 2010) at 6; Reith, supra note 2 at 725.
32
Cosgrave, supra note 1 at 47; Gerda Reith, “On the Edge: Drugs and the Consumption of Risk in Late
Modernity” in Stephen Lyng, ed, Edgework: The Sociology of Risk-Taking (New York: Routledge, 2005) 227.
33
Gerda Reith, “Gambling and the Contradictions of Consumption: A Genealogy of the “Pathological” Subject”
(2007) 51:1 American Behavioral Scientist 33 at 33.
25
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productive for states, and as a legitimate form of leisure for individuals, albeit as a form of
leisure that entails risks of unwanted harms that must be governed.34
Sytze Kingma has outlined the emergence of what he calls a “risk model” of gambling
regulation.35 In this model, gambling is positioned as legitimate commercial entertainment that
is economically productive for the state, but which produces risks of addiction and crime that
must be governed. Kingma contrasts this approach to an “alibi model” of regulation where
gambling is still seen as “intrinsically controversial,” but legalized to channel gamblers away
from illegal markets.36 In the “alibi model” of regulation, states restrict the exploitation of
gambling for private profit by constituting gambling markets with state monopolies and nonprofit organizations, and allocating gambling revenues “to social interests, in terms of welfare,
sports and other ‘just causes’.”37 The legalization and liberalization of gambling be it partial or
total, embodies different ways in which the enterprising state embraces the risk of gambling
markets. Here, gambling, is “put to work” and viewed as “economically productive for the
state,”38 whether through the enterprise of state monopolies, non-profit organizations, or the
gambling industry.
As states legalize and liberalize gambling markets, they are confronted not only with
the productive nature of risk, but also unwanted risks. One category of negative risk is market
risk—risks that spring from the competitive forces of markets.39 For example, where states
operate in closed markets, they must compete with offshore online gambling operators. States
also face regulatory competition when they liberalize and regulate competitive gambling
markets. James Cosgrave and Thomas Klassen argue that deregulation occurs in response to
these market risks as states seek to compete with offshore gambling operators or attract
commercial operators to their markets.40 The legalization and liberalization of gambling
markets is only the starting point for states’ embrace of risk. As markets develop, states respond
to market risk through deregulation to make their gambling markets and offers attractive and
competitive.
The neoliberal affirmation of individual freedom, choice, and responsibility has been
central to how states govern gambling through risk. The neoliberal subject of the “responsible
risk-taker” is projected onto liberalized gambling markets as the responsible gambler—the
gambling subject “required to consume, desire and spend in order to demonstrate responsible
citizenship – but not too much.”41 With the normalization of gambling, the subject of “the
gambler as profligate, wasteful, immoral, irreligious or unproductive” is replaced by the
“responsible risk-taker.”42 Responsible gamblers are expected to manage and rationally avoid
risks arising from their consumption of gambling commodities, aided and enabled by the state
Gerda Reith, “Pathology and Profit: Controversies in the Expansion of Legal Gambling” in Gerda Reith, ed,
Gambling: Who Wins? Who Loses? (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003) at 15 & 21; O’Malley, supra note
2 at 99; Cosgrave, supra note 2 at 47; Reith, supra note 33; Gerda Reith, The Age of Chance: Gambling in Western
Culture (New York: Routledge, 2002).
35
Kingma, supra note 2 at 49.
36
Ibid at 49–50; see also Alan Littler & Johanna Järvinen-Tassopoulos, “Online Gambling, Regulation, and Risks:
A Comparison of Gambling Policies in Finland and the Netherlands” (2018) 30 Journal of Law & Social Policy
94.
37
Ibid at 49–50.
38
Cosgrave, supra note 2 at 47.
39
James F. Cosgrave & Thomas R. Klassen, “Gambling Against the State: The State and the Legitimation of
Gambling” (2001) 49:5 Current Sociology 1 at 12.
40
Ibid at 12.
41
Reith, supra note 2 at 733.
42
Cosgrave & Klassen, supra note 39 at 7–8.
34
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to make informed choices. However, the individualization and privatization of risk also creates
a target population that is unable to moderate their consumption, at risk, and in need of
intervention.43 Here, the problem gambler and the pathological gambler emerge in counterpoint
to the responsible risk-taker. They are made visible through configurations of risk-based
government that rely on the interplay between clinical and epidemiological approaches to
risk.44 For example, technologies of measurement such as the South Oaks Gambling Screen
render the problem gambler and the pathological gambler visible.45 In doing so, risk-based
approaches to governance make problem gambling governable and define the targets of
gambling regulation: the problem gambler, the pathological gambler, and the recreational
gambler.
In these ways, socio-legal research into the diverse and changing ways in which states
govern through risk has been carried forward by critical gambling scholars in their examination
of the liberalization of commercial gambling around the world. I seek to build upon these
bodies of scholarship in what follows. My goal in this research is to develop the socio-legal
and critical gambling scholarship on the growing propensity of states to govern through risk. I
ask: What can we learn about how states govern speculative play through frameworks of risk
by foregrounding online bingo in such an analysis? How do states govern online bingo through
risk? How do states embrace risk through their regulation of online bingo markets? Why is it
that online bingo has become a focal point of contestation in processes of gambling
liberalization? What does this tell us about how bingo is imagined as it moves online? It must
be remembered that land-based bingo is generally seen as a low-risk form of entertainment. In
many places it is more closely associated with charity than commercial gambling and private
profit, and bingo is a form of gambling rooted in local and national environments. However,
as bingo has moved online, it has been commodified, shaped, and driven by large commercial
operators and transnational service providers.46

II. GOVERNING ONLINE BINGO THROUGH RISK
While the first online bingo site emerged in 1998,47 UK-facing sites such as www.uk-bingo.net
began to appear in the early 2000s. An interviewee, who developed some of the first EU facing
bingo sites, described the regulatory landscape at the time as the “wild west” (Interview EU03). Since then, online gambling regulation has developed and facilitated the expansion of
gambling markets. By 2017, the Global Gambling Revenue in the twenty-eight EU Member
States for online gambling was estimated at €20.215 billion.48 Of this, just over €920 million
Dean, supra note 20 at 195; see also Fiona Nicoll, “Beyond the Figure of the Problem Gambler: Locating Race
and Sovereignty Struggles in Everyday Cultural Spaces of Gambling” (2018) 30 Journal of Law & Social Policy
127.
44
Reith, supra note 2; Alan F. Collins, “The Pathological Gambler and the Government of Gambling” in James
F. Cosgrave, ed, The Sociology of Risk and Gambling Reader (New York: Routledge, 2006) 355.
45
Reith, supra note 2 at 727; Henry R. Lesieur & Sheila B. Blume. “The South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS):
A New Instrument for the Identification of Pathological Gamblers” (1987) 144:9 The American Journal of
Psychiatry 1184.
46
Casey, supra note 6.
47
Robert J Williams, Robert T Wood & Jonathan Parke, “History, Current Worldwide Situation, and Concerns
with Internet Gambling” in Robert J Williams, Robert T Wood & Jonathan Parke, eds, Routledge International
Handbook on Internet Gambling (New York: Routledge, 2012) 3 at 4.
48
See H2 Gambling Capital Report in Folkrörelsernas Samarbetsorgan för Spel och Lotterifrågor (Folkspel),
‘Folkspel
Svar
på
Remis
En
Om
Reqlerad
Spelmarknad’
(2017),
online:
<regeringen.se/4a3c81/contentassets/5f3fffd55ef64fdaaff7f2e2bf6ea1db/101-folkrorelsernas-samarbetsorganfor-spel-och-lotterifragor.pdf> [perma.cc/2EUL-KU25] at 7.
43
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was attributed to online bingo. Unlike lotteries and sports betting, which are ubiquitous across
the EU, online bingo is not popular in all EU Member States. A representative from an online
gambling trade association explained:
If it’s a country where they have never really done bingo, it
[online bingo] is a hard sell. It’s such a crowded marketplace
with the games people are familiar with. … For some it is, for
some it’s a huge commercial sector of course. … Generalising
it, when we reach further east in Europe, it drops off the map
(Interview EU-06).
Countries with a culture and tradition of land-based bingo tend to be the key markets for online
bingo. In the context of my research, the United Kingdom (UK), Spain, Italy, Ireland, Denmark,
Portugal, and Sweden emerged as the key online bingo markets in the EU.
Online bingo regulation in the EU is a patchwork of national regimes and approaches.
This has resulted from the absence of sector-wide EU harmonization and the wide margin of
discretion afforded to Member States in how to regulate online gambling. Despite the disparity
of regulatory approaches, I examine below how the UK, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have sought
to govern online bingo through a framework of risk. While online bingo regulation in these
countries has focused on risk minimization, I argue these states have also embraced the
economically productive nature of risk by opening markets and encouraging enterprise,
competition, and innovation in their online bingo markets.

A. OPENING MARKETS, MANAGING RISK, AND ENTERPRISING
GOVERNANCE
Offshore commercial operators and state monopolies have offered online bingo in the EU since
the early 2000s. However, the UK was the first EU Member State to liberalize its online bingo
market with the Gambling Act 2005. The Gambling Act 2005, drawing upon the
recommendations of the 2001 Budd Report, framed gambling as a leisure activity.49 Following
the liberalization of the UK market, key online bingo markets have been liberalized. While
Italy legalized land-based bingo in 2000 and moved to liberalize its online gambling market in
2006, it was not until December 2009 that online bingo was legalized and the market

The Budd Report was published by the “Gambling Review Body” and provided recommendations on how
gambling should be regulated in Great Britain. See UK, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Gambling
Review Body, Gambling Review Report by Sir Alan Budd et al (2001), online: <nationalcasinoforum.co.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/Gambling-Review-Budd-Report.pdf> [perma.cc/4URB-XQKA] [Budd Report]; UK,
HC, “A Safe Bet for Success - modernising Britain’s gambling laws: The Government’s Response to the
Gambling
Review
Report”,
Cm
5397
in
Sessional
Papers
(2002),
online:
<
hblb.org.uk/documents/Special_Betting_Exchange_Consultation/BEC%2092.%20White%20Paper%20A%20Sa
fe%20Bet%20for%20Success.pdf> [perma.cc/3CQD-9TSJ] [“A Safe Bet for Success”].
49
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liberalized.50 Spain liberalized its online bingo market several years later, in 2011, with
Portugal liberalizing its online bingo market in 2016.51
The liberalization and legalization of online bingo in the UK, Italy, Spain, and Portugal
reflect a risk model of gambling regulation in which markets are controlled to deal with the
risk of crime and addiction.52 The responsibilization of individuals is a key means through
which these countries seek to govern the risk of gambling harms, with the provision of
information and self-exclusion being central risk management technologies. These
technologies of agency, “engage us as active and free citizens, as informed and responsible
consumers.”53 Despite the presence of negative risks, gambling markets are also economically
productive for states. The legalization and liberalization of online bingo is also a means through
which states embrace risk.
The move towards enterprising governance is motivated by technological changes that
have rendered national borders porous and challenged traditional approaches to gambling
regulation. As O’Malley observes more generally:
Underlying much of this push towards enterprising governance
has been a series of interlocking discourses about globalisation
as an unavoidable, already present future that renders existing
institutions and arrangements obsolete. It is argued that the
autonomy and boundaries of national economies have been
fractured, the result being that all economic relations have
become subject to an international competition that does not
permit tradition, protectionism or other special pleadings.54
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In the UK, the Budd Report articulated the inability of the state to effectively prevent access to
online gambling.55 The liberalization of online gambling in Spain further points to technology
challenging national borders and an interviewee explained, “the key aim of the legalisation of
online gambling to channel … consumption towards the regulated environment.”56 The
liberalization and commercialization of online gambling in Portugal drew upon the initial
legalization of games of chance in 1927 that noted, “gambling was a fact against which
regressive provisions could do nothing.” The Portuguese government noted, “[o]nline
gambling is widespread all over the world and the Portuguese state cannot ignore this reality.”57
While technology challenges traditional approaches to gambling regulation, it also opens the
opportunity to embrace the economically productive nature of risk taking.
The liberalization of the UK’s online gambling market is the clearest example of
enterprising governance.58 The liberalization of online gambling in the UK aimed “to allow
industry expansion, and to encourage a competitive, commercial market with increased choice
for consumers in the broader interests of the British economy.”59 An interviewee closely
involved in the liberalization debates prior to the 2005 Gambling Act outlined the element of
risk and uncertainty in the decision. They explained that it was difficult “to appreciate the scale
and development of the online industry. … So we didn’t see it coming. Any regulator who said
they did well, I’m sorry, I think they are trying to kid themselves” (Interview EU-23). More
generally, there is a key economic objective that underpins the channelling argument put
forward by many states in their move towards opening gambling markets—channelling
customers to licensed operators stops revenue from leaving states and provides not only licence
fees, but substantial tax revenues for states. As a representative from an online gambling trade
association explained, “I mean for us, we see the major driver as being economic, for a change.
Countries tend to do it [opening gambling markets] when they need tax revenues” (Interview
EU-06).
The entrepreneurial spirit of enterprising governance has meant that moments of
economic crisis are viewed as opportunities to overturn longstanding approaches to gambling
regulation. In Italy, for example, the need to finance the reconstruction efforts following the
L’Aquila earthquake that occurred in the Abruzzo region in April 2009, along with the
country’s mounting deficit, spurred the eventual liberalization of the Italian online gambling
market towards the end of 2009.60 A further and starker example of this type of enterprising
governance is found in Portugal, where a strict approach has traditionally prevailed. Gambling
was prohibited in principle and the charity Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa was entrusted
with monopoly rights to offer certain gambling services such as lotteries and sports betting. In
2007, Portugal defended its right to reserve the provisions of gambling services to Santa Casa
against challenges by commercial gambling operators, and strongly argued against the
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commercialization of its online gambling market.61 Despite this early resistance, Portugal
announced that it would liberalize its online gambling market on 3 October 2013, following
meetings with the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund at the end of September 2013. As part of an IMF-EU bailout, Portugal’s
commitment to liberalize its online gambling market was included in the eighth update of its
Memorandum of Understanding of Specific Economic Policy Conditionality.62 However,
opening online gambling markets is only the initiation of states’ embrace of risk.

B. ROLLING BACK REGULATION AND EMBRACING RISK
When states open gambling markets with the objective of channelling players towards
regulated operators, they embrace risk through the liberalization of online gambling. However,
states must also embrace and respond to “market risk.”63 A number of regulators described the
pressure to roll back regulation to ensure that online bingo markets and offers are attractive to
commercial operators and customers.
There is the risk of establishing rules that are not applicable or
that are or that wouldn’t be accepted, by the industry. If the
industry doesn’t accept the rules they don’t get licensed. You
don’t succeed in moving the gambling from illegal sector to the
legal one. (Interview EU-29)
And, the other part of the tension, let’s say contradictory part of
the tension was facing the reality that in the online sector you
cannot quite work under the same context or paradigm when it
comes to regulating that it that might be applicable under land
based, because if you are too, let’s say, strict or prescriptive, at
the end of the day, the access to the unregulated offer is very
difficult to keep citizens from. (Interview EU-36)
For online bingo, regulations prescribing game mechanics and those relating to ancillary
products such as casino games and slots emerged as key areas where states rolled back
regulation to make markets and offers more attractive for commercial operators and customers.
Many of the online bingo operators and software suppliers that were interviewed for
this research stressed the importance of being able to innovate, design, and offer new bingo
variants. However, a number of Member States including Spain and Italy drew upon the
prescriptive regulatory framework for land-based bingo when initially regulating online bingo.
In Italy, only 90 ball bingo was allowed, and prizes could only be awarded for the first line and
full card.64 Spain only allowed for 90, 80, and 75 ball bingo and required online bingo to be
strictly pari-mutuel (where prizes come directly from the common pool of money wagered in
a particular bingo game).65 Operators explained:
61
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Spain again was a bit of a nightmare, very prescriptive, there are
only two forms of the bingo gaming that you can currently play
out there, very much limited in terms of what you can offer in
terms of the jackpots and ticket pricing.(Interview EU-04)
Italy … It’s literally completely black and white what you have
to do. And there is no deviation from that. A couple of companies
have tried to innovate around it by changing the front end
slightly in terms of the display of a bingo ticket, but it’s not
something that’s going to derive a massive upside … (Interview
EU-04)
[In Italy] … we found that the bingo offering that you could
provide into the Italian market was very regimented. … And so,
you couldn’t provide a variety of bingo products that we’d like
to have offered. … So they have very much sort of restricted sort
of creativity which is allowed in the UK and Spain and Ireland,
to give the player a bit of experience. (Interview EU-20)
One regulator mentioned how in hindsight it was clear that the initial way in which
online bingo was regulated in Spain was overly prescriptive and had restricted the ability of
operators to innovate and develop a broad portfolio of products (Interview EU-36). He went
on to note that this made sense at the time when one could not foresee how the market would
turn out or behave. Another regulator noted: “there [in Italy] is a huge pressure from the
industry to change the rules. And I agree with them, because the objective when we started to
regulate online and, during all this year, we’ve been trying to regulate it in a way that it could
be competitive with the offshore offerings” (Interview EU-29). He went on to note that in Italy,
there was a need to establish “flexible” rules in order to present games offered in the regulated
market as “absolutely comparable to the dot.com … illegal market” and to halt the decline in
online bingo (Interview EU-29). In response to such pressures, both Italy and Spain rolled
back their regulation of game mechanics to allow operators to innovate and create new bingo
variants beyond those that were allowed in the land-based environment.66
Online bingo is peculiar in that it is not a big revenue generator for operators. Many
interviewees explained that slots, casino games, and other side games are significant revenue
streams for online bingo operators. A number of operators have described how bingo is run as
a “loss leader” and that around fifty per cent of revenues are generated through slots, casino,
and side games (Interviews: EU-03; EU-04).67 Regulators also drew attention to the reliance
that online bingo operators placed upon these ancillary products. A regulator spoke about his
realization:
While Spain implemented their regulations, Italy’s implementation has been delayed. See: Notification
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[T]he online bingo model is remarkably similar to the offline
bingo model in that the bingo game can be a loss leader or
making a modest profit, but because the gaps in the game and
the distractions of slots and other games and the cross selling of
other products, it’s essentially used as a marketing vehicle. It
brings people in. It provides them entertainment. It even has the
social element of chat rooms. But actually, generally speaking,
the operators want their bingo players to also play on slots where
there’s a more significant return to the operator than through the
bingo game. (Interview EU-23)
Understanding bingo as a loss-leader highlights the importance of a regulatory model that
permits online bingo operators to offer slots and other side games. A software supplier
explained that the Spanish online bingo market had not taken off because it was only recently
that operators could legally offer online slots (Interview EU-03). An interviewee explained that
this prohibition in the 2011 Spanish regime was based upon a “prescriptive and precautionary
spirit” (Interview EU-36). However, in 2014, Spain introduced regulations for the provision of
online slot machines.68 An interviewee stated that the reason for this change was a realization
that online slots were a “sufficiently important” product and that online gambling operators
needed “a robust and synergic portfolio of products” (Interview EU-36).
The use of bingo, as a stalking horse by online operators to draw customers towards
more lucrative forms of gambling, prompts us to rethink how states govern risk. Here, the
legalization and liberalization of gambling markets includes creating regulatory models that
facilitate the cross selling of gambling products. These regulatory models allow online bingo
sites to become spaces in which other “harder” forms of gambling, given their faster rates of
play, are offered alongside bingo.69 The desire to make online bingo markets attractive and
economically productive for commercial operators drives states to embrace risk through
regulation that allows for the creation of gambling environments, in which perceived “softer”
forms of gambling are deployed to draw consumers towards more harmful and lucrative
gambling products. This observation pushes us to rethink the role that bingo plays for online
operators and how this is enabled by regulation. It also requires us to be cognizant of how
regulation can facilitate the creation of particular online gambling spaces and environments.
In many countries, gambling markets are regulated to minimize the risk of crime,
gambling harms, and the loss of tax revenue. These risks arise not only from the nature of
gambling products and markets, but also from the presence of unauthorized operators and the
inability of states to channel consumers to regulated markets. Risk in the context of gambling
markets can also relate to market risks. I have argued above that many EU Member States’
online bingo regulation has been orientated towards minimizing these risks. At the same time,
governments have embraced risk through opening and encouraging enterprise, competition,
and innovation in markets. In the following section, I burrow down into the liberalization
debates in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Ireland to reveal how the formulation of
Ministry of Finance and Public Administratios, “Order HAP/1370/2014, 25 July, Approving the Basic
Regulations
for
Betting
on
Online
Slot
Machine
Games”
(2014),
online:
<ordenacionjuego.es/cmis/browser?id=workspace://SpacesStore/0c622978-56a7-4464-8e3f-4a2ea48ebbb6>
[perma.cc/YB4S-H2TH].
69
See Jim Orford et al, Gambling and Problem Gambling in Britain (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2003) at 82
for a discussion of the relationship between rate of play and problem gambling.
68

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2018

48

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 30 [2018], Art. 3

online bingo as a commercial commodity has jarred with its earlier formulation as a means of
charitable fundraising and revenue generation for good causes.

III. FROM WELFARE TO RISK: THE
COMMERCIALIZATION OF ONLINE BINGO
Online bingo’s classification as a lottery and the game’s regulation have been shaped by the
characteristics of land-based bingo—a low-risk “fun” game, closely associated with charity
and community. However, as it has moved to the online environment, the game has become
commodified and shaped by large transnational commercial providers. Commercial logics and
technological innovation have transformed the game into a commodity. Commercial operators
now offer a huge array of bingo game variants with faster rates of play than traditional landbased bingo, with games sometimes lasting shorter than one minute.70 Within the gambling
space provided by online bingo sites, players are able to play online slot machines, casino
games, and other side games.71
However, given bingo’s importance to state lotteries and non-profit organizations, it
has become a focal point of contestation in the liberalization and commercialization of online
gambling. According to one interviewee, “[w]hen the negotiations take place if there’s any sort
of give, often it’s the bingo that is not allowed to be licensable to private companies first. But
that’s where the lotteries would see themselves moving to next if they moved anywhere”
(Interview EU-20). Within these boundary disputes, commercial and non-profit gambling
enterprises mobilize around questions of ownership over bingo as it moves online.

A. COMMERCIALIZATION, RISK, AND THE EROSION OF BINGO
EXCEPTIONALISM
The classification of bingo as a form of lottery game is a central device used to assign
ownership over the game. When discussing problems faced by commercial operators, a
representative from an online gambling trade association explained that:
There is a huge [problem] for bingo operators, which is in, I
wouldn’t say most, but certainly in many, many member states
they class it as a lottery. And so even if they licence the online
gambling market they will not offer licences for this. If you look
at Denmark, which is often held up as the best two or three
licensing, licensing and tax regimes and they licence everything,
pretty much. Bingo no, because it’s a lottery and that’s reserved
for the state lottery. So you’ve got that whole issue of definition.
(Interview EU-06)
Denmark, Sweden and Ireland have deployed different regulatory frameworks to carve online
bingo out from the competitive market and reserve it for non-profit organizations and/or the
state—a form of bingo exceptionalism. Ireland has not explicitly regulated online bingo and
the game in its online form still falls under the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956, which prohibits
private profit being derived from lotteries, and provides that licences can only be granted where
70
71
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lotteries are run for charitable and philanthropic purposes.72 In the 1965 case of Bolger v
Doherty, the Irish Supreme Court held that bingo fell within the definition of lottery for the
purposes of the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956.73 Consequently, online bingo in Ireland can
only be provided by organizations run for charitable and philanthropic purposes. While
Denmark introduced a licencing regime for most online gambling products in January 2012,
Section 6 of the Act on Gambling reserved the right to provide lotteries, including online
lotteries, for the state monopoly, Danske Spil.74 Although not defined in the Danish Act on
Gambling, an explanatory note explained that online bingo is included in the definition of
lotteries reserved to the state monopoly, Danske Spil.75 By contrast, the Swedish Lotteries Act
1994 (SFS 1994:1000) provides that permits to arrange “true lotteries” can only be granted to
Swedish non-profit associations and to the state monopoly, Svenska Spel.76 The Swedish
Lotteries Act 1994 was amended in 2002 to allow for the possibility of Swedish non-profit
associations and Svenska Spel to offer lottery games online.77 In Sweden, online bingo is
treated as a numbers game like lotto, and falls within the definition of a “true lottery” in the
Swedish Lotteries Act 1994. As such, non-profit associations and Svenska Spel may be
permitted to offer online bingo.78 The close relationship between lotteries and bingo has been
important for questions of ownership over the game. Further, definitions and categories play a
significant role in creating boundaries between commercial and non-profit gambling markets,
and also in assigning ownership over particular forms of gambling.
Despite this bingo exceptionalism, there has been a move towards the liberalization and
commercialization of online bingo in Denmark, Sweden, and Ireland. In 2013, the Irish
government approved the Gambling Control Bill 2013: General Scheme.79 The Bill proposes
to allow commercial operators to be licensed to offer online bingo for the first time in Ireland.80
In March 2017, the governmental inquiry on Swedish gambling regulation recommended the
liberalization and commercialization of many forms of online gambling through the
introduction of a licencing regime, including online bingo.81 In December 2017, the Swedish
government published the Draft Gambling Act, which provides for the liberalization and
commercialization of the Swedish online bingo market and is due to come into force in January
2019.82 In March 2017, Denmark notified the European Commission that it would remove
72
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online bingo from state monopoly and allow licensed commercial operators to offer the game
on the Danish market from January 2018.83 In contrast, the Netherlands’ initial draft of the
Remote Gambling Bill, which purportedly sought to liberalize online gambling and introduce
a licence regime for certain forms of online gambling, segmented lottery products from the
competitive market and initially considered bingo type games as lottery products.84 However,
the move towards liberalization and commercialization is seen in subsequent drafts of the
Remote Gambling Bill, which have proposed that while “long odds” bingo will be defined as a
lottery product and reserved for the non-profit sector, commercial operators will be able to
offer the faster “short odds” form of the game on the regulated market.85 With this, we see the
erosion of the earlier bingo exceptionalism discussed above.
Concerns with risks posed by unlicensed and unregulated online operators drive the
liberalization and commercialization of online bingo. The Danish government outlined in its
notification to the European Commission that the black market for online bingo in Denmark
was twice the size of the regulated market.86 The notification went on to explain that “[t]he
proposed liberalisation of online bingo thus aims to channel players away from the unregulated
market into a Danish regulated market with protection of the players and measures to prevent
gambling addiction.”87 This channelling argument—by which states govern the risks
associated with gambling through the creation of a market that channels players away from
unregulated operators and to regulated operators—lies at the heart of the Swedish proposal to
liberalize and commercialize online bingo, with the report directly quoting the Danish findings
regarding the size of the black market for online bingo in Denmark.88 One of the key issues
identified by the Swedish proposal is that the existence of offshore operators “impedes the
opportunities for dealing with problem gambling and gambling addiction.”89 In the initial Irish
report on the regulation of online gambling, it was noted that any attempt to reserve online
bingo for the non-profit sector would “in all likelihood, only serve to drive customers to
unlicensed operators,” and thus limit one of the core objectives of the Gambling Control Bill:
to protect “vulnerable persons, including children, from risks to their well being arising from
gambling.”90 With the ability of technology to render national borders porous and allow
83
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gambling operators to penetrate protected markets, states again are attempting to govern the
risks associated with online gambling, such as the risk of crime and addiction, through a form
of enterprising governance that would create competitive markets for online bingo.91
Risk, however, can be economically productive. Governing the risks associated with
gambling through the creation of competitive markets brings with it the possibility of increased
tax revenues, as states licence operators currently operate offshore. As the Swedish report
mentions, “[t]he new regulation is intended to secure the financing of central government
activities and public interests to as great an extent as possible.”92 The proposal notes that future
reviews of gambling regulation should focus not only on issues of public health, but also tax
revenues.93 Interestingly, while online bingo is a small percentage of the Swedish online
gambling market, the report explained that the liberalization and commercialization of online
bingo is necessary to ensure that commercial gambling operators can maintain a broad product
portfolio.94 Thus, governing gambling risks through regulated competitive markets is not just
an attempt to govern the negative risks associated with online bingo, but a way in which states
embrace the economically productive nature of risk.

B. BOUNDARY DISPUTES
Questions of sector ownership reverberate through debates about the commercialization and
liberalization of online bingo. These questions are driven by bingo’s liminal position between
commercial and non-profit gambling. These questions are evident in the uncertainty as to
whether online bingo will be liberalized and commercialized in the Netherlands. According to
an interviewee:
[E]verybody knows in the Netherlands that lobbying from
current incumbents and lobbying from the good causes has
played a significant role, because they see a threat that online
gambling is expected to be regulated … For some games it’s
clear that it will be regulated [licenced]: sport betting, poker,
casino games. For some games it’s clear that it will still remain
illegal online like the lottery. But for bingo it’s not clear.
(Interview EU-38)
Further, recounting the decision to reserve online bingo to the Danish state monopoly in
January 2012, an interviewee explained that the Danish government,
[D]ecided to go ahead and open a multi-licensing regime, but
only for online betting, for online casinos and online poker, and
there were discussions about online bingo. Obviously the
industry wanted online bingo to be part of the online reform and
to be privatised, but other stakeholders thought that bingo should
be kept in the monopoly with the lottery games and that was the
outcome. (Interview EU-26)
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In gambling liberalization debates in Sweden, the Swedish Bingo Association argued in 2017
that online bingo should not be commercialized because, both in principle and by tradition,
bingo belonged to the “Peoples Movement.”95 Another non-profit organization argued in these
debates that online bingo, like land-based bingo, belonged to the category of “public gaming.”96
A similar line of arguments is seen in discussions about the online gambling regulation and the
proposed commercialization of bingo in Ireland. A member of the Irish Parliament noted that
bingo is “a sector which was always reserved for the good cause part of our society.”97 These
arguments are particular to bingo given the game’s history and its relationship both to nonprofit and commercial gambling. Boundary disputes, however, are fought on two sides.
Commercial operators drive the commercialization and liberalization of online bingo
by exploiting the porous nature of national borders and by engaging in boundary disputes. A
representative from an online gambling trade association noted that the boundary disputes
relating to online bingo were the key spaces in which they encountered the game in policy
discussions (Interview EU-06). The interviewee explained the trade association pushed against
any attempt to “carve out” online bingo for the state or incumbent lottery operators (Interview
EU-06). Questions of ownership were explicit in the debates in Sweden where the Swedish
Trade Association for Online Gambling (BOS) argued that online bingo was being offered in
free markets and belonged to the free market.98 Similarly, the Kindred Group, which owns
brands such as 32 Red and Unibet, contended that online bingo should not be “taken” from the
competitive market.99 These disputes about the rightful ownership of bingo, and indeed the
different depictions of bingo, once again highlight “diverse nature of bingo as a political
economic formulation.”100
Non-profit organizations recognize that risk is a key framework for the governance of
gambling and this has coloured their strategy of resistance to the commercialization of online
bingo. I noted earlier that online bingo operators are reliant upon online slots, casino games,
and other side games as a means of revenue generation, and that online bingo is used as a
marketing vehicle for these ancillary products. As I argued above, the use of bingo as a stalking
horse to draw consumers towards other forms of gambling raises questions about the perception
of bingo as a gentler, less risky form of gambling. Many non-profit organizations put forward
this argument and its underlying concern of risk in their responses to the proposed
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commercialization of online bingo in Sweden. Folkspel, a Swedish charity lottery whose
members include seventy-three non-profit organizations, commissioned H2 Gambling Capital
to undertake research on the online bingo market in the EU. Echoing my argument above, the
report emphasized the importance of casino games and slots for online bingo operators, and
Folkspel deployed it to argue that the liberalization and commercialization of online bingo
would convert bingo from a low-risk form of gambling into a high-risk form of gambling given
the mingling and cross selling of products on commercial online bingo sites.101 Folkspel argued
that commercialization would thus result in a higher number of problem gamblers.
Accordingly, reserving online bingo for the non-profit sector is no longer framed solely as a
means of fundraising, but also a way in which online bingo can be governed through a
framework of risk.
Concerns with risk do not dissolve the politics of distribution in debates around the
liberalization and commercialization of online bingo. Questions remain about the proper
allocation of gambling proceeds and the role gambling plays in the funding model of non-profit
organizations and good causes. In Denmark, moving online bingo to the competitive market
was tied to an agreement to compensate the good causes supported by Danske Spil’s online
bingo profit, estimated to be DKK 14 million.102 The Swedish governmental inquiry on
gambling regulation made reference to the importance of non-profit associations, and
protecting their “gambling domains” and sources of revenue.103 In response to the proposal to
commercialize online bingo in Sweden, a number of non-profit organizations argued that the
report did not take into account the impact of such a change on their ability to fundraise, given
that online bingo was their most important source of online gambling revenue.104 Similar
contestations are also present in debates in Ireland and the Netherlands, with charities seeking
to ensure that the profit from online bingo are reserved for good causes.105
While the classification of bingo as a lottery game was the central device used to assign
ownership of online bingo to the non-profit operators in the early life of online gambling, the
proposed liberalization and commercialization of online bingo in Ireland, Denmark, Sweden,
and the Netherlands emphasizes the unstable nature of such classifications. The Irish Gambling
Control Bill proposes to remove bingo from its current classification as a lottery game.106 While
previously classified as a lottery game in Denmark, online bingo is now classified as a casino
game that can be offered on online casinos, beginning since January 2018.107 A similar
approach is being taken in the Netherlands, where “short odds” bingo will be classified as a
casino game.108 Further, the Swedish Draft Gambling Act 2018 excludes online bingo from the
categories of online lotteries, which will be reserved to Svenska Spel and the non-profit
associations.109
The exclusion of online bingo from its earlier classification as a lottery game shows the
significant role that these legal devices play in questions of ownership over gambling forms.
However, the repositioning of online bingo also signifies the changing ways in which the game
is imagined as it moves online. Online bingo is now principally perceived as a commercial
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gambling commodity and it has become more closely associated with forms of gambling such
as casino games rather than lotteries.

IV. CONCLUSION
Law and society scholarship have analyzed the diverse and changing ways in which states
govern through risk. In tandem, critical gambling scholars have shown how states are
increasingly governing gambling through a framework of risk. Here, states seek to manage the
negative risks relating to individual harm and crime, while embracing the economically
productive nature of risk that arises from the liberalization of gambling markets. In this article,
I have explored what we can learn about how states govern through risk by foregrounding
online bingo in an analysis of gambling regulation.
I documented how states such as the UK, Italy, Spain, and Portugal have legalized and
liberalized their online bingo markets. Drawing upon my empirical research, I argued that the
move towards the legalization and liberalization of online bingo is a form of enterprising
governance, driven by the economically productive nature of liberalized markets and the
erosion of national borders by the technology. I have uncovered how concerns with “market
risks” from unlicensed operators drove states to roll back regulations related to the mechanics
of bingo and the use of ancillary gambling products such as slots and casino games. This
enterprising governance seeks to make online bingo markets attractive and economically
productive for commercial operators. Importantly, it is through this enterprising governance
that states change the nature of bingo in its online form and produce spaces where bingo is
mingled with other gambling products. Developing upon my previous work, where I argue that
these developments pose challenges for charities and non-profit organizations,110 this paper
illustrates how these changes are driven by enterprising governance and regulation that
embraces the economically productive nature of risk.
Bingo has received relatively little academic attention compared to other forms of
online gambling. It tends to be overshadowed by sports betting, casino games, and poker, or
subsumed in discussions of lotteries. While unsurprising in some respects, it is also curious
given that online bingo has been a significant focal point of contestation in the process of online
gambling liberalization in countries such as Denmark, Sweden, Ireland, and the Netherlands. I
have highlighted in this paper how these contestations have taken the form of boundary
disputes, in which the framing of bingo as a commercial commodity clashes with a traditional
understanding of the game as a means of fundraising for charities and good causes. The
classification of bingo as a lottery game was a key regulatory device used to assign ownership
over the game. It created a form bingo exceptionalism where the game was reserved for
charities and good causes and prevented from being a source of private profit. However, the
liberalization and commercialization of online bingo in these countries has resulted in online
bingo’s transition from its earlier classification as a lottery game and the erosion of the bingo
exceptionalism. The move towards the liberalization and commercialization of online bingo
and the resulting boundary disputes spotlight not only the diverse meaning and content that
different groups attach to bingo, but also the changing way in which bingo is imagined as it
moves online.
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